Selling options for income

The research was done by AI agents that open web pages. Some sites refuse them; where that happened we say so. The small numbers point to the source list at the end. Where a figure is our own sum or guess, it is marked “our estimate” and the basis is given.

The claim

Our collection holds only 2 tweets on this scheme¹. View counts are as collected on 6 October 2026. One tweet comes from an account large enough to name under our rules. The other comes from an account with about 8,000 followers, so we describe it without quoting or naming it¹. With so few tweets, this page rests on how the method is promoted generally and on public data about it. The page judges the scheme, not the people who tweeted.

“My Boring Options Strategy SP500 & Stocks Made $150,000 (COPY MY SYSTEM) $AMD $SPY”

@TradingWarz, 13 September 2026, 16,465 views¹²

The tweet ends with a link to an X Space, which is a live audio room². We did not listen to it, and we did not view any images, videos or threads attached to either tweet. The tweet text gives a profit of $150,000. The tweet itself does not give the amount of money the profit was earned on, or the period². Without those, a profit cannot be turned into a rate of return. The account’s website does link a public sheet of dated trades, described under “Who makes money from it”³⁷³.

The second tweet, posted in July 2024 and seen 15,854 times, sets out a plan: first get $100,000 invested, then learn to sell options and make $2,000 to $3,000 a month from them¹. The collection records nothing for sale with it¹. Our copy of the text is cut off partway through its fourth step¹. We read the plan as $2,000 to $3,000 a month from the $100,000. The tweet does not say so in those words.

If that is the meaning, it is 2% to 3% a month, or 24% to 36% a year (our estimate: $24,000 to $36,000 divided by $100,000). That is the claim this page tests.

What the scheme is

An option is a contract. A put gives its buyer the right to sell 100 shares to you at a fixed price (the strike) until a fixed date (the expiry). A call gives its buyer the right to buy 100 shares from you at the strike. The buyer pays you a fee up front, called the premium. If the option is never used, you keep the premium and owe nothing.

Selling a put is close to selling insurance. If the price falls below the strike, you must buy the shares at the strike, which is now more than they are worth.

There are two fully backed ways to do this:

• A cash-secured put: you keep enough cash in the account to buy the 100 shares if you have to.
• A covered call: you already own 100 shares and sell someone the right to buy them. You keep the premium but give up any rise above the strike.

“The wheel” is the name for doing both in turn: sell puts until you are made to buy the shares, then sell calls on those shares.

There is also a way without full backing. An uncovered (or “naked”) option is sold without the full cash or shares behind it. The broker asks only for a deposit, called margin. This is leverage: controlling more than the account holds. Three times leverage means $300,000 of exposure on a $100,000 account.

The scheme is real. Option buyers have, on average, paid more than the market’s later movement justified. From 1990 to 2018 the market’s expected swing in the S&P 500 averaged 19.3% while the actual swing averaged 15.1%¹⁵. That gap is what the seller is paid for. The source is Cboe, the exchange that lists these options, so it has an interest¹⁵.

The arithmetic

Step 1: how much one contract ties up

One option contract covers 100 shares. SPY is a fund that tracks the S&P 500, the index of 500 large US companies. SPY closed at $778.57 on 9 October 2026⁷. A cash-secured put on SPY near that price needs about $76,000 to $78,000 in cash⁷. One contract on the stock AMD needs $56,000 to $62,000⁸.

So $100,000 secures one SPY contract⁷. Cheaper routes exist. SPYM, another S&P 500 fund, closed at $91.66, and a put at strike 92 ties up about $9,200⁷². It paid about the same rate as SPY: 1.71% for 42 days (our sum from a buying price of $1.50 and a selling price of $1.65)⁷². But these options trade thinly. Only 25 contracts were open at that strike, and the gap between buying and selling prices was about 10% of the premium, against about 0.5% on SPY (our estimate)⁷⁷². So a small account can sell a cash-backed index put, but because the rate is the same, the capital needed for a given income does not change.

Step 2: what the premium pays today

We read Cboe’s delayed option prices for the close of 9 October 2026 and took puts expiring 42 days later, on 20 November⁷. Two terms first. At-the-money means the strike is at the current price. Delta is a rough gauge of how likely the option is to be used: a “30-delta” put has about a 30% chance, a “16-delta” put about 16%. The percentages are our sums.

Prices from⁷. This is premium collected, before any losses: 0.4% to 1.1% a month that day, against the 2% to 3% in the claim⁷.

That day was calm. The VIX, a gauge of expected swings in the S&P 500, was 14.84⁵³. Premiums are higher when the market is nervous. From 2006 to 2018, at-the-money index puts collected an average of 22.1% a year, which is about 1.8% a month (our sum)⁹. So the low end of the claim, read as premium coming in, is ordinary over history. The gap is between premium collected and money kept, which is Step 3.

A cash-backed seller also earns interest on the cash. The 4-week US Treasury bill, a short loan to the US government, yielded 4.03% on 9 October 2026²². That is about $336 a month on $100,000 for doing nothing (our estimate)²². The index returns in Step 3 include this interest. The premium figures above do not.

Step 3: premium is not profit

Cboe publishes an index called PutWrite (ticker PUT). It tracks what would happen if you sold a one-month at-the-money S&P 500 put every month, with the cash held in Treasury bills¹⁰. It is a calculated index, not a real account, and it ignores trading costs¹³.

• Premium collected: an average of 22.1% of the account a year from 2006 to 2018⁹. An earlier Cboe release put it at 24.1% a year for 2006 to 2015¹⁰. A weekly version of the index collected 37.1%⁹.
• Return actually earned: 7.27% a year from 3 January 2007 to 9 October 2026, and about 8.6% a year over the last ten years¹¹. These are our sums from Cboe’s daily index file. They include the interest on the Treasury bills.

So the seller kept roughly a quarter to a third of the premium, and that counts the bill interest (our estimate: 7.27 divided by 22.1 is 33%, though the two periods differ). The rest went back out in the months when the puts were used. A summary of the Cboe-sponsored study gives a matched pair for 2006 to 2015: 24.1% a year collected, 6.6% a year earned, which is 27%¹⁰¹³. We read that 6.6% in a summary, not in the study itself.

This explains the claim. 24% to 36% a year is about what at-the-money index puts collect⁹¹⁰. It is not what the seller keeps.

The weekly version collected more premium and earned less: 4.46% a year since 2007 (our sum from Cboe’s file)¹¹.

How does this compare with just holding the index? Over 37 years the PUT index earned 9.40% a year against 9.91% for the S&P 500¹². Over the last ten years it earned about 8.6% a year while SPY earned 15.18% (to 30 September 2026)¹¹¹⁷. We could not get the S&P 500’s figure for the exact 2007 to 2026 window.

Step 4: the capital the claimed income needs

Money that must be set aside for three monthly incomes. All figures are our estimates from the sources named.

The “premium only” rows are money coming in before losses. The last two rows are what was kept.

At the returns the index actually earned, $100,000 averages about $600 to $720 a month (our estimate: $100,000 times 7.27% or 8.6%, divided by 12)¹¹. More than half of that, at today’s rates, is the $336 of plain bill interest (our estimate)²².

Step 5: it does not arrive monthly

These figures are our sums from Cboe’s daily file for the PUT index since January 2007¹¹.

• 63 of 237 months were losses¹¹.
• The middle month gained 1.12%. The worst months were October 2008, down 17.7%, and March 2020, down 13.4%¹¹.
• Of 226 twelve-month periods, 15 reached 24% or more, the low end of the claim. 39 were losses. The middle one was 8.2%¹¹.
• Calendar years: 2008 lost 26.8%, 2018 lost 5.9%, 2022 lost 7.7%. 2021 gained 21.8% and 2024 gained 17.8%¹¹.
• The deepest fall, from peak to low on daily values, was 37.1%, from May 2008 to March 2009. The index did not regain its old level until November 2010¹¹. On month-end values the same file gives 32.7% (our sum), which matches Cboe’s published figure⁹¹¹.
• In 2020 the index fell 28.9% in 22 trading days, from 20 February to 23 March¹¹.

For comparison, the S&P 500 fell 50.9% at its worst over Cboe’s 2006 to 2018 study period⁹. The put seller’s falls were smaller, but they were not small.

Step 6: the two ways to reach the claimed number

Volatile single stocks. AMD’s options were priced for swings about 4.5 times as large as SPY’s on 9 October 2026⁷⁸. A 42-day AMD put with a 28 delta paid $2,078 on $56,000 of cash, which is 3.71%, or about 2.65% per 30 days (our sum)⁸. That matches the claim. But one contract takes more than half of a $100,000 account, so the whole account sits in one or two stocks whose prices are expected to move a great deal⁸. And this is premium only.

Karsten Jeske, a blogger with a long record of selling index options (see below), writes that “for some high-volatility tech stocks, you could collect enough premium without leverage”⁴⁵. He also writes: “The options wheel has had a good run in the last few years, though even in almost perfect market conditions, some people still managed to destroy their portfolios”, and says those conditions held only because the two recent bear markets were “short and shallow”⁴⁵. We found no index or long record showing what single-stock put selling earned after losses.

Margin. The industry regulator FINRA sets the minimum deposit for an uncovered index option at the option’s value plus 15% of the index value, with a floor of 10%²³. For a single stock it is 20%²³. By our estimate a 30-delta S&P put needs about $10,800 of margin for about $78,000 of exposure⁷²³. So $100,000 could carry the five contracts needed to collect $2,500 a month. That is about $380,000 of exposure, or 3.8 times the account (our estimate)⁷²³. Brokers may ask for more than the minimum²³.

Losses are on the full $380,000 of exposure, not on the $100,000. The unleveraged index fell 28.9% in under five weeks in 2020¹¹. At 3.8 times, a fall of that size is larger than the account (our estimate: 28.9% times 3.8 is about 110%).

Step 7: costs and tax

Fees are small. tastytrade charges $1 per contract to open and nothing to close³². Robinhood charges $0.50 per index option contract plus exchange and regulatory fees³³. On a $732 SPY premium, $1 is 0.14% (our sum)⁷³². No paid tool is needed.

Tax is larger. In the United States, premium from a stock or fund option that expires is a short-term capital gain³⁴. Short-term gains are taxed at the same rates as wages. Options on broad indexes are treated as 60% long-term and 40% short-term gain³⁴. The claimed monthly figure is before tax. We checked the United States only.

What people who tried it report

The long record. A guest article on Cboe’s site, by an author who manages option-selling money, covers the PUT index from July 1986 to August 2023. Beside the 9.40% a year against 9.91% already given, its worst fall was 32.66% against 50.96% for the S&P 500¹². The put seller earned slightly less than the stock holder, with a smoother ride¹². An older study found the same shape for 1986 to 2008: premium of 19.8% a year, return of 10.3%. We read that only in a Wikipedia summary¹⁴.

Real funds. Several funds sell options on an index and pay out the premium. Their results are published and audited.

Returns are to 30 September 2026¹⁶¹⁸²⁰. The QQQ figure is from a data site that shows no date¹⁹. Global X also shows a second measure, the “distribution rate”, based on the latest payout only: 8.33% for XYLD and 11.13% for QYLD¹⁶¹⁸.

The payouts are real: about $670 to $1,000 a month per $100,000 (our estimate from the trailing payout rates)¹⁶¹⁸²⁰.

Over a decade of strong markets these funds earned roughly half the yearly rate of the plain index^16171819. That compounds to well under half the total gain: 8.49% a year for ten years is about +126%, and 15.18% is about +311% (our estimate)¹⁶¹⁷.

But the picture is not one-sided. In the 12 months to 30 September 2026, XYLD returned 17.57% against 15.60% for SPY¹⁶¹⁷. First Trust, a fund company, notes that Cboe’s covered-call index beat the S&P 500 in three of the four periods in its table when the S&P 500 fell, and by 2.83 percentage points in 2026 to 20 March²¹. In 2025, a strong year, the S&P 500 rose 17.86% while the covered-call index rose 8.91%²¹.

XYLD’s payout rate over the last 12 months (10.82%) is above its average yearly return over ten years (8.49%) and since 2013 (8.35%)¹⁶. Global X’s pages for both funds say the distribution “is estimated to include a return of capital”, which means part of a payout can be the investor’s own money coming back¹⁶¹⁸.

One individual with a long published record. Karsten Jeske, who writes the blog Early Retirement Now, has sold S&P 500 options since 2011 and publishes his results⁴³. They are his own figures, shown as charts and tables. We saw no brokerage statements. He reports:

• 7.06% a year added to his account from January 2018 to September 2025, after trading costs, and 4.30% in the most recent year. Both figures are in a table image on his page⁴³. He writes that since late 2022 he has “walked down my return and risk target”⁴³.
• $103,700 of option profit in 2025⁴⁴. Just under $90,000 of it came from just over 10,000 contracts that expire the same day or the next⁴⁴.
• About 3.3 times leverage as of September 2024⁴⁵.

He writes: “So far, I’ve made money with the strategy in every calendar year since 2011.”⁴³ He also writes that people with “a relatively small nest egg” should “maybe don’t worry about options trading yet”, and says $110,000 is the minimum for the kind of margin account he uses⁴³. We could not confirm that minimum on a broker’s page. He does not give his account size.

How results can be overstated. The same writer gives a made-up example of the wheel on a $100,000 account. The options bring in $2,000. The shares the seller was made to buy are down $3,000. The true result is a $1,000 loss, but a seller who reports only “realised” results, meaning positions already closed, would show the $2,000⁴⁵. He presents this as what “less-than-honest YouTube influencers report”, not as what sellers in general do⁴⁵. In the same post he writes: “I believe 100% that selling options is a fundamentally profitable strategy”⁴⁵. Researchers at the fund manager AQR make a related point: “the revenue generated from selling the call option is not income”⁵⁰. It is payment for taking on a risk.

Studies of ordinary traders. We found no data on what share of US retail option sellers make money, or what the typical seller earns. What exists:

• A Journal of Finance study of US option trades from November 2019 to June 2021 found that trades it identifies as retail lost $2.10 billion, assuming each was held for 10 days⁴⁶. It sorts by trade, not by account. For short-term contracts it describes two groups: “those who buy short-term options and lose money, and those who sell these contracts and make significant profits, even after transaction costs.”⁴⁶ It adds that the sellers’ result after costs was mostly “not statistically different from zero”, which means it could have been chance⁴⁶. A footnote says the result reverses when trades are held to expiry: “Investors lose on their short positions and gain on their long positions”, mostly from large price moves in contracts with 3 to 12 months to run⁴⁶. “Short” here means sold. Holding to expiry is how monthly put selling is usually run.
• A study of all accounts in Korea’s index options market reports that “selling volatility is the most successful strategy”⁴⁸. We read only the abstract.
• India’s regulator found that 93% of more than 10 million individual futures and options traders lost money over three years⁴⁹. This covers buyers and sellers together, in a different market.

A copyable system that was sold to followers. MarketWatch reported in January 2026 on a group led by David Chau, known as “Captain Condor”⁴¹. The article says the group had “roughly 1,000 investors”, and that newcomers agreed to pay $5,500 a year for trade alerts⁴¹. The trades were “iron condors” on the S&P 500: four options at once, some sold and some bought, so that the loss on each trade is capped⁴¹. That is not the plain put or call selling this page tests. According to the article, the group also doubled its trade size after each loss⁴¹.

By Mr Chau’s own account, the strategy had not failed since he began it in May 2022⁴¹. One member told MarketWatch it had been reliably profitable but that the group “had narrowly avoided a few blowups”⁴¹. An outside analyst estimated the group’s losses for Christmas week 2025 at more than $50 million⁴¹. That figure is an estimate, not an audited number, and we found no regulator or court document.

Mr Chau’s explanation, as quoted by a trade blog: “I use a probability-based approach and although I understood this as a possible outcome, this issue did not exist for the specific model over the last three years.”⁴² MarketWatch quotes him as saying “We will regroup and try again.”⁴¹ His representative told MarketWatch: “David has acknowledged the recent event publicly and is currently rebuilding his models. He is not providing further comment at this time.”⁴¹

Professional sellers who ran into margin calls or hidden risk. These cases concern only the companies named in them. None involved plain cash-secured puts.

• LJM, a Chicago fund manager that sold options on S&P 500 futures (a future is an agreement to trade the index at a later date), had “catastrophic trading losses exceeding $1 billion, or more than 80% of the value of the funds LJM managed, over two trading days” in February 2018³⁵. The SEC alleged that investors were misled about the risk³⁵. In the SEC case, final judgments were entered by consent on 30 June 2025, without the defendants admitting or denying the allegations³⁶. The CFTC brought a parallel case under the title “CFTC Charges Chicago Commodity Pool Operators, Owner, and Former Chief Portfolio Manager with Fraud and Supervision Failures”³⁷. We did not read how that case ended.
• UBS sold an S&P 500 options programme to about 600 clients in 2016 and 2017. The SEC found that “some of UBS’s advisors did not understand the risks”. UBS paid about $24.6 million without admitting or denying the findings³⁸.
• Allianz Global Investors’ “Structured Alpha” options funds lost billions in March 2020. The SEC charged the firm with concealing the downside risk. The firm agreed to pay more than $1 billion to the SEC and, with its parent, over $5 billion in restitution³⁹.
• About 300 client accounts managed by OptionSellers.com fell below the broker’s margin requirements in one week of November 2018, “primarily as a result of significant and unexpected price fluctuations in the natural gas markets”, and were closed out⁴⁰. The broker’s annual report says it was still owed $29.2 million from those accounts a year later⁴⁰. It also says clients brought arbitration claims against it, which it called “without merit”⁴⁰. The filing does not describe the trades. The case shows that an account run on margin can end up owing more than it held⁴⁰.

What the rules allow now

Selling options in your own account is legal. No platform bans it. The rules that matter are the broker’s approval, margin and tax.

Approval. A US broker must approve an account for options before the first trade, after asking about income, net worth, aims and experience²⁴. Brokers sort strategies into levels. At Webull, cash-secured puts and covered calls are at the lowest level, and uncovered selling needs the top level and at least $10,000 in the account³⁰. Robinhood allows covered calls and cash-secured puts and states: “Robinhood doesn’t allow uncovered or naked positions”²⁸. A summary of Schwab’s help page describes the same order³¹. Schwab’s, Fidelity’s and Interactive Brokers’ own pages refused our agents, so the largest brokers’ rules are not confirmed.

Approval is not proof of fit. In 2021 FINRA found that Robinhood’s automated system had “approved thousands of customers who did not satisfy the firm’s eligibility criteria or whose accounts contained red flags that options trading may not be appropriate for them”⁵⁵. The settlement was a $57 million fine plus about $12.6 million in restitution, covering several matters⁵⁵. Robinhood consented “without admitting or denying the findings”⁵⁵. In 2024 TD Ameritrade agreed to pay $600,000 to resolve FINRA allegations about its automated options approvals, as reported by the ABA Banking Journal⁵⁶. We did not read the FINRA document for that one. These cases concern only the companies named in them.

The lopsided payoff. In Robinhood’s own teaching example, a put with a $95 strike sold for $2.10 collects $210 and can lose up to $9,290²⁸. The Options Industry Council, the industry’s education body, puts it this way: “The premium earned is comparatively small compensation for accepting the large downside risk of a stock owner.”⁵² It adds that a cash-secured put is no riskier than owning the shares⁵².

Uncovered selling can lose more than you put in. FINRA says of an uncovered call that “the maximum loss is theoretically unlimited”²⁵.

Assignment. Being “assigned” means the buyer uses the option and you must deliver. On stock and fund options, including SPY, this can happen “on any day equity markets are open”²⁶. Options on the S&P 500 index itself can be used only at expiry²⁶.

A recent change. Until this year, an account under $25,000 that traded in and out on the same day was restricted as a “pattern day trader”. The SEC approved FINRA’s proposal to “eliminate provisions relating to ‘pattern day traders’” and the $25,000 minimum on 14 April 2026²⁷. FINRA’s rulebook shows the change effective 4 June 2026²³. Firms have up to 18 months to switch, and we did not check which brokers have²⁷. The change lets smaller accounts sell very short-dated options.

Selling the system to others is a different legal position. Trading your own money needs no licence. Someone paid to advise others on investments is generally an investment adviser under US law. Newsletters are excluded only if the advice is impersonal and not tailored to a client⁶¹. The US Federal Trade Commission’s stated rule on training is: “It is illegal to make earnings claims in marketing investment opportunities or training, unless the seller has a reasonable basis to make such claims”⁶⁰. It said that in a 2020 complaint against Online Trading Academy, which sold courses costing up to $50,000⁶⁰. That case was settled in September 2020 by a stipulated court order, meaning one both sides agreed to. It required the company to offer to cancel customers’ debts and included a $362 million judgment, partly suspended because the defendants could not pay⁷⁴⁷⁵. We did not read whether the order included any admission. In 2022 RagingBull.com, which sold stock and options alert services, settled with the FTC for $2.425 million. The FTC said the company “did not track its customers’ trading results and had no basis on which to make any claims about how much subscribers could make”⁵⁸. Neither case was about option selling as a method. Both concern only the companies named. Neither the adviser rule nor these cases is a statement about the accounts or sites quoted on this page; we did not assess whether any of them needs to register.

Who makes money from it

Three groups earn whether or not the seller does.

Brokers and exchanges. tastytrade collects $1 on each contract opened³². Robinhood reported “options revenue of $314 million, up 41%” for the last three months of 2025, the largest part of its $776 million in trading revenue for that quarter⁶⁵. Its customers traded 659 million option contracts in those three months⁶⁵. Cboe, whose index figures this page relies on, runs the exchange where the options trade.

Fund companies. Net assets in funds that sell options for income grew by $56 billion in 2025, according to Morningstar figures quoted by First Trust²¹. XYLD charges 0.60% a year and JEPI 0.35%¹⁶²⁰.

People who sell alerts, courses and tools. What we saw:

• The site tradingwarz.com lists “Options VIP” at $79.99, described as live alerts for weekly S&P 500 option sales delivered in a Discord chat group³. The page does not say whether the price is monthly³. It also lists a bundle at $888, shown against a stated value of $2,667⁴. The site states: “We are NOT registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission” and says its information is “strictly for entertainment purposes only”³. Its resources page carries links with a referral code to TradingView and Interactive Brokers and a discount code for TrendSpider⁶. The site’s footer links to the X account @TradingWarz, and the X profile links to the same YouTube channel the site links to²³⁷⁶.
• The same site links a free public sheet of its trades, and advertises daily recaps “WITH Broker Statements” for members³⁷³. We opened the sheet. It lists about 245 dated rows from 9 May 2025 to 4 October 2026, mostly weekly puts and calls sold on S&P 500 futures⁷³. Seven rows show a loss, the largest $58,364.20⁷³. Its summary shows “Options CSP Profit $ 112,464.38”, “Less: Covered Calls $ (79,561.74)”, “Open Leaps & Shares $ 718,385.00” and “Net Profit 752,231.72”⁷³. (“CSP” is cash-secured put; “leaps” are long-dated options.) These are the site’s own figures. We saw no brokerage statements. The sheet gives no account size, so no rate of return can be worked out from it, and we did not find the tweet’s $150,000 in it.
• Referral programmes pay for sign-ups. TradingView says: “Earn up to $400 for each eligible new subscriber.”⁶² TrendSpider pays “between 10% and 30% of the recurring revenue” and forbids partners from “using income promises”⁶³. tastytrade pays $100 per funded referral⁶⁴. We did not see whether anyone is paid through the links above.
• Tools: Option Alpha, which automates option trades, costs $99 to $149 a month, and is free through partner brokers⁶⁶. OptionsPlay costs “$100/month or $750/year”⁶⁷.
• Two other sellers of options training show no price. Rockwell Trading offers a “Mastermind” by application⁶⁸. Invest With Henry advertises “consistent income using options” and states that its founder turned “$2000 into a $1.5 Million account” in 2020⁶⁹. That is the site’s own statement. We did not check it.

The upside

This scheme differs from many on this site: the method itself has a long, measured, positive return.

The best documented outcomes.

• The index: 9.40% a year for 37 years, with about two thirds of the stock market’s ups and downs¹². This is calculated, before costs, and published by an interested party.
• Real funds: 8.35% a year for XYLD since June 2013 and 9.01% a year for QYLD since December 2013¹⁶¹⁸. These are audited. In the 12 months to 30 September 2026 XYLD returned 17.57%¹⁶.
• One individual: $103,700 in 2025, and about 7% a year since 2018 on top of what his underlying investments earned⁴³⁴⁴. This is his own statement. He does not give his account size.

What the top tenth earn. This figure is missing. No source we found ranks retail option sellers by result.

A realistic good result. For someone selling fully cash-backed options on a broad index, the evidence points to 7% to 10% a year over a period that includes both a boom and a crash, with smaller falls than the index and less gain in strong years¹¹¹²¹⁶. On $100,000 that is about $600 to $830 a month before tax, unevenly spread (our estimate). A skilled seller adding options to an existing portfolio reports 4% to 7% a year extra, using leverage and daily attention⁴³⁴⁵.

At those rates, $2,500 a month needs about $350,000 to $410,000, as the last rows of the Step 4 table show¹¹. At the individual’s reported 4.3% to 7% extra, it needs about $430,000 to $700,000 (our estimate)⁴³.

Speed. There is no audience to build and no product to make. An approved account can collect its first premium within days. But the first year says little. The index gained 21.8% in 2021 and lost 26.8% in 2008¹¹. The Captain Condor group had, by its leader’s account, about three and a half years without a failure first⁴¹.

What it takes to compete

Capital. This is the main requirement. A small account can sell a covered index option, as Step 1 shows, but the income is in proportion. The US central bank’s survey found that among the 21% of families who own shares directly, the middle family held $15,000 of them in 2022⁵⁴. At 7% to 9% a year, $15,000 earns about $90 to $110 a month (our estimate)¹¹⁵⁴. The people for whom the claimed income works already hold several hundred thousand dollars.

Staying covered. The collapses in this page’s evidence involved margin, hidden risk or raising the stakes after losses^35394041. The long positive record belongs to the fully cash-backed index version¹¹¹².

Sitting through bad years. The cash-backed index lost 26.8% in 2008 and took until November 2010 to recover¹¹.

Measuring the right number. The people with credible results measure the change in total account value and compare it with simply holding the index⁴³⁴⁵.

Skill and time, for the extra return. The one individual with a long record trades more than 10,000 contracts a year, with rules for cutting losses⁴⁴. That is not a copied alert.

What it costs. Fees of about $1 a contract³². No course or tool is required. The real cost is the growth given up in strong markets: over ten years XYLD returned 8.49% a year against 15.18% for SPY¹⁶¹⁷. In flat and falling stretches the comparison has gone the other way²¹.

How to tell early whether you are on the cash-backed side or the borrowed side.

• If your total exposure (strike times 100, added up over every contract sold) is larger than the cash in the account, you are using leverage. The index record does not describe your risk.
• If the account’s total value, counting shares you were made to buy at their current price, is behind an index fund over the same period, the “income” is coming out of your own capital.
• If your target needs you to keep more than about 0.6% to 0.8% a month after losses, the index record does not support it without leverage or concentrated stocks (our estimate: 7.27% and 9.40% a year, divided by 12)¹¹¹².
• If someone offers a system, ask for the capital, the period, the losing months and the total account value. A profit figure alone answers none of these.

What we did not verify

• The collection holds 2 tweets, so we cannot say how the claim is usually worded or what share of promoters sell something. We read the named tweet through a third-party copy of X’s data, not on x.com. Our copy of the second tweet is cut off, and our reading of it as $2,000 to $3,000 a month on $100,000 is an inference.
• We did not listen to the X Space linked in the quoted tweet or view any YouTube videos. The $150,000 figure, its period and the capital behind it are unknown to us. The public trade sheet is the site’s own record; we did not check it against brokerage statements. Whether the $79.99 price is monthly is not stated.
• All PUT index returns, monthly counts, twelve-month periods and falls are our own sums from Cboe’s daily file, starting in January 2007 because earlier daily data is sparse. They are not Cboe’s published statistics. We could not get the S&P 500’s total return for that exact window.
• Option prices are one day’s delayed quotes at a calm time. For other periods we have only the 2006 to 2018 average premium.
• We found no long record for selling puts on single stocks such as AMD. The 2.65% a month is premium only. Published tests of the wheel on past prices could not be opened.
• We re-read the one-year return for XYLD and SPY only. The latest-year figures for QYLD and JEPI were not re-read.
• Some pages were first read through a tool that summarises the page, not as raw text: FINRA Rule 4210, Webull, the CFTC release and parts of tradingwarz.com. Quotes from those should be re-checked before publication.
• Routes: FINRA pages, ir.cboe.com, the Cboe insights posts, the Morningstar copy of the MarketWatch article, OptionStrat, the FTC releases, Robinhood’s results, Early Retirement Now, First Trust, and the Global X, JPMorgan and State Street fund pages refused a direct fetch or showed no figures, and were read through the reader r.jina.ai. The ABA Banking Journal page opened directly but not through the reader. sec.gov opened directly once a contact address was given. Schwab, Fidelity, Interactive Brokers, the options clearing house’s risk booklet, SSRN, Reddit and WisdomTree’s put-selling fund refused both routes.
• The studies behind Cboe’s premium figures were not opened; we used Cboe’s releases and one summary. The Korean study was read as an abstract only. The appendix of the Journal of Finance study, which holds the held-to-expiry tables, was not opened.
• The $50 million Captain Condor figure is an outside analyst’s estimate. We did not check whether any legal or regulatory action followed.
• We did not read the final outcome of the CFTC’s LJM case, the FINRA document in the TD Ameritrade matter, or whether the Online Trading Academy order included an admission.
• Tax was checked for US federal rules only, in the 2025 edition of the IRS guide.
• The Federal Reserve survey is from 2022.
• Course prices at Rockwell Trading and Invest With Henry were not established. Whether European retail clients can run this on US-listed funds was not established either; we saw only a search summary of a broker page.

Sources

1. Does It Pay collection of 2 tweets on this scheme, collected 2026-10-06. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
2. @TradingWarz tweet and profile, read through api.fxtwitter.com. https://api.fxtwitter.com/TradingWarz/status/2099217507659759686 . Tweet dated 2026-09-13. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
3. tradingwarz.com, home page. https://tradingwarz.com/ . Undated, copyright 2026. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
4. tradingwarz.com, “Bundle Apprentice”. https://tradingwarz.com/bundle-apprentice/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
5. tradingwarz.com, “Auto Fibonacci Indicator”. https://tradingwarz.com/auto-fibonacci-indicator/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10 (not cited in the text).
6. tradingwarz.com, “Resources”. https://tradingwarz.com/resources/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
7. Cboe delayed option quotes, SPY. https://cdn.cboe.com/api/global/delayed_quotes/options/SPY.json . Quotes as of the 2026-10-09 close. Read at source on 2026-10-10; percentages are our estimates.
8. Cboe delayed option quotes, AMD. https://cdn.cboe.com/api/global/delayed_quotes/options/AMD.json . Quotes as of the 2026-10-09 close. Read at source on 2026-10-10; percentages are our estimates.
9. Cboe, “New research shows options-based strategies can generate higher gross premiums with less volatility over traditional asset classes”. https://www.cboe.com/insights/posts/new-research-shows-options-based-strategies-can-generate-higher-gross-premiums-with-less-volatility-over-traditional-asset-classes . 2019-05-13. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
10. Cboe, “New Study On Weekly, Monthly S&P 500 PutWrite Indexes Released”. https://ir.cboe.com/news/news-details/2016/New-Study-On-Weekly-Monthly-SP-500-PutWrite-Indexes-Released-01-27-2016/default.aspx . 2016-01-27. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
11. Cboe, PUT index daily history (and WPUT_History.csv in the same folder). https://cdn.cboe.com/api/global/us_indices/daily_prices/PUT_History.csv . Data to 2026-10-09. Read at source on 2026-10-10; returns and counts are our estimates from the file.
12. Cboe Insights (guest article), “Generating income and managing risk: cash-secured put writing in a low equity return environment”. https://www.cboe.com/insights/posts/generating-income-and-managing-risk-cash-secured-put-writing-in-a-low-equity-return-environment . 2023-10-06. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
13. CXO Advisory, “Performance of CBOE PutWrite Indexes”. https://www.cxoadvisory.com/equity-options/performance-of-cboe-putwrite-indexes . 2016-04-06. Secondary.
14. Wikipedia, “CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index” (summary of a 2009 Ennis Knupp study). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBOE_S%26P_500_PutWrite_Index . Read 2026-10-10. Secondary.
15. Cboe, “White paper shows volatility risk premium facilitated higher risk-adjusted returns for PUT index”. https://www.cboe.com/insights/posts/white-paper-shows-volatility-risk-premium-facilitated-higher-risk-adjusted-returns-for-put-index/ . 2019-05-29. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
16. Global X, XYLD fund page. https://www.globalxetfs.com/funds/xyld/ . Returns as of 2026-09-30, distribution as of 2026-10-09. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
17. State Street, SPY fund page. https://www.ssga.com/us/en/intermediary/etfs/spdr-sp-500-etf-trust-spy . Returns as of 2026-09-30. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
18. Global X, QYLD fund page. https://www.globalxetfs.com/funds/qyld/ . Returns as of 2026-09-30, distribution as of 2026-10-09. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
19. Stock Analysis, “QYLD vs QQQ”. https://stockanalysis.com/etf/compare/qyld-vs-qqq/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
20. J.P. Morgan Asset Management, JEPI fund page. https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-management/adv/products/jpmorgan-equity-premium-income-etf-etf-shares-46641q332 . Returns as of 2026-09-30, yield as of 2026-10-09. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
21. First Trust, “An Update on Covered Call Returns”. https://www.ftportfolios.com/Commentary/MarketCommentary/2026/3/24/an-update-on-covered-call-returns . 2026-03-24. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
22. US Treasury, daily Treasury bill rates. https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/daily-treasury-rates.csv/2026/all?type=daily_treasury_bill_rates&field_tdr_date_value=2026&page&_format=csv . 2026-10-09. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
23. FINRA Rule 4210, Margin Requirements. https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/4210 . As amended effective 2026-06-04. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
24. FINRA Rule 2360, Options. https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2360 . As amended effective 2022-03-29. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
25. FINRA, “Options” (investor page). https://www.finra.org/investors/investing/investment-products/options . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
26. FINRA, “Trading Options: Understanding Assignment”. https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/trading-options-understanding-assignment . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
27. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Release 34-105226. https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/sro/finra/2026/34-105226.pdf . 2026-04-14. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
28. Robinhood, “Basic options strategies (Level 2)”. https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/basic-options-strategies/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
29. Robinhood, “Expiration, exercise, and assignment”. https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/expiration-exercise-and-assignment/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10 (not cited in the text).
30. Webull, “Available options strategies”. https://www.webull.com/help/faq/10980-Available-options-strategies . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
31. Schwab StreetSmart help, “Option Approval Levels”. https://help.streetsmart.schwab.com/pro/4.36/Content/Option_Approval_Levels.htm . Undated. Secondary (search summary; page could not be opened).
32. tastytrade, pricing. https://tastytrade.com/pricing/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
33. Robinhood, “Trading fees on Robinhood”. https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/trading-fees-on-robinhood/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
34. US Internal Revenue Service, Publication 550 (2025). https://www.irs.gov/publications/p550 . For 2025 returns. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
35. US Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2021-89 (LJM). https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-89 . 2021-05-27. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
36. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release 26338 (LJM). https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26338 . 2025-07-01. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
37. US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, release 8392-21 (LJM). https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8392-21 . 2021-05-27. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
38. US Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2022-117 (UBS). https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-117 . 2022-06-29. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
39. US Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2022-84 (Allianz Global Investors). https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-84 . 2022-05-17. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
40. INTL FCStone Inc., annual report (Form 10-K) for the year ended 2019-09-30. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/913760/000091376019000141/intl0930201910-k.htm . 2019-12-12. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
41. MarketWatch, on Morningstar, “‘I experienced a catastrophic financial loss’: How options trader ‘Captain Condor’ led his followers to a $50 million wipeout”. https://www.morningstar.com/news/marketwatch/20260101173/i-experienced-a-catastrophic-financial-loss-how-options-trader-captain-condor-led-his-followers-to-a-50-million-wipeout . 2026-01-01. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
42. OptionStrat blog, “Condor Revenge”. https://optionstrat.com/blog/condor-revenge . 2026-01-20. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
43. Early Retirement Now, “Options” page. https://earlyretirementnow.com/options/ . Updated 2025-10-01. Read at source on 2026-10-10, including the table image of returns.
44. Early Retirement Now, “Options Trading Series Part 14: Year 2025 Review”. https://earlyretirementnow.com/2026/01/30/options-trading-series-part-14-year-2025-review/ . 2026-01-30. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
45. Early Retirement Now, “The Wheel Strategy Doesn’t Work (Options Series Part 12)”. https://earlyretirementnow.com/2024/09/17/the-wheel-strategy-doesnt-work-options-series-part-12/ . 2024-09-17. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
46. Bryzgalova, Pavlova and Sikorskaya, “Retail Trading in Options and the Rise of the Big Three Wholesalers”, Journal of Finance 78(6). https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/2827/1/The%20Journal%20of%20Finance%20-%202023%20-%20BRYZGALOVA%20-%20Retail%20Trading%20in%20Options%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20the%20Big%20Three%20Wholesalers.pdf . 2023. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
47. Abstract of the same paper on IDEAS/RePEc. https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v78y2023i6p3465-3514.html . 2023. Secondary (not cited in the text).
48. Hu, Kirilova, Park and Ryu, Management Science 70(7), abstract on IDEAS/RePEc. https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v70y2024i7p4742-4761.html . 2024. Secondary.
49. Securities and Exchange Board of India, press release on individual traders in equity futures and options. https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/sep-2024/1727086965496.pdf . 2024-09-23. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
50. Israelov and Nielsen (AQR), “Covered Call Strategies: One Fact and Eight Myths”, Financial Analysts Journal 70(6). https://www.aqr.com/-/media/AQR/Documents/Insights/Journal-Article/FAJ-Covered-Call-Strategies-One-Fact-and-Eight-Myths.pdf . 2014. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
51. Israelov and Nielsen (AQR), “Covered Calls Uncovered”. https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Research/Journal-Article/Covered-Calls-Uncovered . 2015. Secondary (not cited in the text).
52. Options Industry Council, “Cash-Secured Put”. https://www.optionseducation.org/strategies/all-strategies/cash-secured-put . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
53. Cboe, SPX index dashboard. https://www.cboe.com/us/indices/dashboard/spx/ . Values as of the 2026-10-09 close. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
54. Federal Reserve, “Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2019 to 2022” (Survey of Consumer Finances). https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf23.pdf . 2023-10. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
55. FINRA, Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, Robinhood Financial. https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/robinhood-financial-awc-063021.pdf . 2021-06-30. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
56. ABA Banking Journal, on FINRA’s TD Ameritrade settlement. https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2024/06/td-ameritrade-agreed-to-pay-600k-to-resolve-finras-flawed-automated-approval-allegations . 2024-06-03. Secondary (a trade journal reporting a FINRA settlement).
57. FINRA, Regulatory Notice 21-15. https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/21-15 . 2021-04-09. Read at source on 2026-10-10 (not cited in the text).
58. US Federal Trade Commission, press release on the RagingBull.com settlement. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/03/online-investment-site-pay-more-24-million-bogus-stock-earnings-claims-hard-cancel-subscription . 2022-03-08. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
59. US Federal Trade Commission, RagingBull.com case page. https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/2023073-x210014-ragingbullcom . Complaint 2020-12-14. Read at source on 2026-10-10 (not cited in the text).
60. US Federal Trade Commission, press release on Online Trading Academy. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-sues-online-trading-academy-running-investment-training-scheme . 2020-02-12. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
61. US Securities and Exchange Commission staff, “Regulation of Investment Advisers”. https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf . 2013-03. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
62. TradingView, partner programme. https://www.tradingview.com/partner-program/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
63. TrendSpider, affiliates. https://trendspider.com/affiliates/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
64. tastytrade, referral programme. https://tastytrade.com/referral/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
65. Robinhood Markets, fourth quarter and full year 2025 results. https://investors.robinhood.com/news-releases/news-release-details/robinhood-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2025-results . 2026-02-10. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
66. Option Alpha, pricing. https://optionalpha.com/pricing . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
67. OptionsPlay, pricing. https://www.optionsplay.com/pricing . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
68. Rockwell Trading, Mastermind programme. https://www.rockwelltrading.com/mastermind-program/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
69. Invest With Henry, home page. https://www.investwithhenry.com/ . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
70. Interactive Brokers knowledge base, PRIIPs. https://ibkb.interactivebrokers.com/node/2993 . Undated. Secondary (search summary; page could not be opened; not cited in the text).
71. Cboe, PUT index dashboard. https://www.cboe.com/us/indices/dashboard/PUT/ . Undated. Opened on 2026-10-10, but the index description did not load; not cited in the text.
72. Cboe delayed option quotes, SPYM. https://cdn.cboe.com/api/global/delayed_quotes/options/SPYM.json . Quotes as of the 2026-10-09 close. Read at source on 2026-10-10; percentages are our estimates.
73. Public trade sheet linked from tradingwarz.com (Google Sheet). https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1hbIEAHU3KaBZY_tvjCGwtQenZcNrvggMwwLDf8gQYW4/edit?gid=0 . Rows dated 2025-05-09 to 2026-10-04. Read at source on 2026-10-10; the figures are the site’s own.
74. US Federal Trade Commission, Online Trading Academy case page. https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/182-3175-x200032-online-trading-academy . Last entry 2020-09-15. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
75. US Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Settlement Requires Online Trading Academy to Forgive Consumer Debt, and Principals to Turn Over Millions in Cash and Assets”. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/09/ftc-settlement-requires-online-trading-academy-forgive-consumer-debt-principals-turn-over-millions . 2020-09-15. Read at source on 2026-10-10.
76. YouTube, channel page @TradingWarzOfficial. https://www.youtube.com/@TradingWarzOfficial . Undated. Read at source on 2026-10-10 (channel identifier only; no videos viewed).

Corrections

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